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Testing for detecting the infection by SARS-CoV-2 is the bridge between the lockdown and
the opening of society. In this paper we modelled and simulated a test-trace-and-
quarantine strategy to control the COVID-19 outbreak in the State of S~ao Paulo, Brasil.
The State of S~ao Paulo failed to adopt an effective social distancing strategy, reaching at
most 59% in late March and started to relax the measures in late June, dropping to 41% in
08 August. Therefore, S~ao Paulo relies heavily on a massive testing strategy in the attempt
to control the epidemic.
Two alternative strategies combined with economic evaluations were simulated. One
strategy included indiscriminately testing the entire population of the State, reaching more
than 40 million people at a maximum cost of 2.25 billion USD, that would reduce the total
number of cases by the end of 2020 by 90%. The second strategy investigated testing only
symptomatic cases and their immediate contacts e this strategy reached a maximum cost
of 150 million USD but also reduced the number of cases by 90%.
The conclusion is that if the State of S~ao Paulo had decided to adopt the simulated strategy
on April the 1st, it would have been possible to reduce the total number of cases by 90% at
a cost of 2.25 billion US dollars for the indiscriminate strategy but at a much smaller cost of
125 million US dollars for the selective testing of symptomatic cases and their contacts.
© 2020 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi
Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).matics, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Rua Praia de Botafogo 190, Rio de Janeiro, CEP, 22250-900, RJ, Brazil.
ad).
unications Co., Ltd.
ting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
M. Amaku, D.T. Covas, F.A. Bezerra Coutinho et al. Infectious Disease Modelling 6 (2021) 46e55Introduction
Despite lockdowns in China, SARS-CoV-2 spread rapidly throughout the world by predicted routes of transportation
(Bogoch et al., 2020) and spread faster than any other emerging infectious disease in recent decades (Angelo et al., 2019;
Halstead & Wilder-Smith, 2019; Tuite et al., 2019; Wilder-Smith, Chang, & Leong, 2018). The first case of COVID-19 in Latin
America was confirmed on February 26, 2020, in the S~ao Paulo metropolis, the most populous city in the Southern hemi-
sphere (~12 million people) (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2020). Travel reports and subsequent genetic
analyses confirmed that the first detected infection was acquired via importation of the virus from Northern Italy (Candido
et al., 2020; Jesus et al., 2020). Since then, Brazil has reported the largest number of cases in Latin America (4,238,446 reported
cases and 129,522 deaths as of September 11, 2020) (Ministerio da Saúde do Brasil, 2020). SARS-CoV-2 spread rapidly within
Brazil (Carmo et al., 2020), often associated with urban centers with social deprivation (Souza et al., 2020) and has now been
detected in the majority of the 27 federal states of Brazil. Using transmission pairs of SARS-CoV-2 reported to the Brazilian
Ministry of Health, themean and standard deviation for the serial interval was estimated to be 2.97 and 3.29 days respectively
(Prete et al., 2020).
Social distancing, stay-at-home policies and discontinuation of mass gatherings up to complete lockdowns are important
tenets of public health measures to mitigate the explosive growth of COVID-19 (Wilder-Smith & Freedman, 2020). However,
the most effective public health measures include liberal testing, prompt isolation of all test positive persons, contact tracing
of all test positive cases and enforced quarantining of all contacts (Hellewell et al., 2020; Salathe et al., 2020).
Here we set out to model the number of infections and deaths depending on the timing and extent of testing and contact
tracing in the State of Sao Paulo, the most populous state of Brazil with 44, 639, 899 inhabitants (Biblioteca Virtual do Estado
de S~ao Paulo, 2020).The model
Themodel is a modified version of the classical SEIR type of models (Massad et al., 2020) and considers that the population
is divided into several compartments, namely: susceptible individuals at time t, SðtÞ; tested susceptible individuals, ST ðtÞ;
exposed individuals, EðtÞ; asymptomatic/oligosymptomatic individuals, AðtÞ; infectious individuals, IðtÞ; isolated infected
individuals, QðtÞ; hospitalized individuals, HðtÞ; individuals with severe disease hospitalized in intensive care units (ICU),
GðtÞ; and recovered individuals, RðtÞ.Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the model compartments.
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rate m, or acquire the virus with contact rate b, or be tested for the SARS-CoV-2, with rate xS that begins at a time ti after the
beginning of the outbreak.
(ii) Tested susceptible individuals, denoted ST ðtÞ, die by natural causes with the same ratem, or acquire the virus with the
same contact rate b.
(iii) Once infected, the susceptible move to the state of Exposed, denoted EðtÞ. These individuals either die by natural
causes with the same ratem, or evolve to the infectious individuals, denoted IðtÞ, with rate dI , or beggining at ime ti, be tested
for the SARS-CoV-2, with rate xE or evolve to asymptomatic/oligosymptomatic individuals, denoted AðtÞ, with rate dA.
(iv) Infectious individuals, IðtÞ, evolve for one of two states: Hospitalized individuals denoted HðtÞ, or to a state in which
individuals evolve to and develop severe disease, necessitating respiratory assistance, denoted GðtÞ, with ratessHand sG,
respectively. Infectious individuals, IðtÞ, also die by natural causes with rate m, or by the disease, with rate aI , and can be tested
for the SARS-CoV-2, with rate xI that begins at time ti.
(v) Individuals in the three states, AðtÞ, HðtÞ, and GðtÞ, can die by natural causes with rate m, or by the disease, with rates
aAaH , and aG, respectively. All indivuduals who acquired the infection and who did not die by the disease recover to a new
state, denoted RðtÞ, with rates gIgA, gHand gG, respectively.
(vi) Tested individuals who resulted positive for the presence of the virus are quarantined in a stated denoted QðtÞ. Since
these individuals are isolated from the rest of the population, they do not transmit the virus and will eventually recover from
the infection,
with rate gQ , or will die by natural causes, with ratem. A small fraction of asymptomatic individuals develop symptoms and
are hospitalized with rate sA.
(vii) We assumed that the population birth rate LðtÞis equal to the natural mortality of the population, not taking into
account the disease-induced mortality.
(viii) The fractions pE , pI , pA, pH , and pG of exposed, symptomatic, asymptomatic, hospitalized and severe (ICU patients)
individuals can transmit the infection.
The model’ states are shown in Fig. 1.
The model’s dynamics is described by the following set of differential equations:
dSðtÞ
dt
¼ bS ðpEE þ pII þ pAAþ pHH þ pGGÞ
N




ðpEE þ pII þ pAAþ pHH þ pGGÞ
N
þ xSSqðt  tiÞ  mST
dEðtÞ
dt
¼ bðSþ ST Þ
ðpEE þ pII þ pAAþ pHH þ pGGÞ
N
 ðmþ dA þ dI þ xEqðt  tiÞÞE
dIðtÞ
dt
¼ dIE  ðgI þ sH þ sG þ xIqðt  tiÞ þ aI þ mÞI
dAðtÞ
dt
¼ dAE  ðgA þ xAqðt  tiÞ þ mÞA
dHðtÞ
dt
¼ sHI  ðgH þ aH þ mÞH
dGðtÞ
dt
¼ sGI  ðgG þ aG þ mÞG
dQðtÞ
dt







¼ gI I þ gAAþ gHH þ gGGþ gQQ  mR
N ¼ Sþ E þ I þ Rþ Aþ H þ Gþ Q þ Rþ ST
L ¼ mðE þ I þ Rþ Aþ H þ Gþ Q þ Rþ ST Þ
(1)The Basic Reproduction Number of system (1) is given by:
R0 ¼
bdIð1þ UÞ
ðmþ dA þ dIÞðgI þ sH þ sG þ aI þ mÞ
(2)where:48
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ðgI þ sH þ sG þ aI þ mÞ
dI
þ pAdA
dIðmþ aA þ gAÞ
þ
þ pHsHðmþ aH þ gHÞ
þ pGsGðmþ aG þ gGÞ
(3)The incidence of infection is given by:
Inc¼ bðSðtÞþ ST ðtÞÞ
ðpEEðtÞ þ pIIðtÞ þ pAAðtÞ þ pHHðtÞ þ pGGðtÞÞ






ðpEEðtÞ þ pIIðtÞ þ pAAðtÞ þ pHHðtÞ þ pGGðtÞÞ






5dt (6)Finally, the total number of tested individuals is given by:Table 1
Parameters used in the model.
Parameter Description Value
bðtÞ Potentially infective contact rate Fitted (changes over time)
pE Infectivity of exposed individuals 0.4
a
pI Infectivity of symptomatic individuals 1.0
a
pA Infectivity of asymptomatic individuals 1/3
a
pH Infectivity of hospitalized individuals 0.01
a
pG Infectivity of ICU patients 0.01
a
m Natural mortality rate (life expectancy of 70 years) 3.91  105 days1 a
dI Rate of evolution from exposed to infected 1/2 day
1 a
dA Rate of evolution from exposed to asymptomatic 1.45 day
1 b
gI Rate of recovery from infected 1/3 day
1 a
gA Rate of recovery from asymptomatic 1/14 day
1 a
gH Rate of recovery from hospitalized 1/10 day
1 a
gG Rate of recovery from ICU 0.06752 day
1 b
gQ Rate of recovery from isolated 1/14 day
1 a
aI Disease-induced mortality rate for infected individuals 5  104 day1 a
aA Disease-induced mortality rate for asymptomatic individuals 0
a
aH Disease-induced mortality rate for hospitalized individuals 2.2012  104 day1 b
aG Disease-induced mortality rate for ICU patients Fitted (changes over time)
xS Testing rate of susceptible individuals Variable
xE Testing rate of exposed individuals Variable
xI Testing rate of symptomatic individuals Variable
xA Testing rate of asymptomatic individuals Variable
sH Hospitalization rate 1.973  102 day1 b
sG ICU admission rate Fitted (changes over time)
KðtÞ Notification ratio Fitted (changes over time)




Fig. 2. Cumulative number of reported cases and deaths (black dots in (a) and (b), respectively) and the corresponding fitted model (blue lines). The solid lines
and shaded area correspond, respectively, to median values and 95% probability intervals.
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Data on the cumulative number of reported cases and deaths were obtained from Seade (Fundaç~ao Sistema Estadual de
Analise de Dados do Estado de S~ao Paulo). Data on the number of ICU patients were obtained from SIMI (Sistema de Mon-
itoramento Inteligente do Estado de S~ao Paulo). A fitting procedure based on the Levenberg-Marquardt non-linear least-
squares algorithm was used to fit the model’s parameters simultaneously to the data on cases, deaths and ICU patients.
We used the R package minpack.lm (Elzhov et al., 2016).
We assumed that the potentially infective contact rate, the notification ratio, and the ICU admission rate change every 10
days. (As it will be explained in another paper this simulates the propagation of the disease and compliance with social
distancing rules). The parameter values used are shown in Table 1.50
Fig. 3. Results for the strategy that considers testing susceptible and infected (symptomatic and asymptomatic) individuals showing the evolution of the testing
strategy efficacy (1 minus the number of cumulative cases under a specific testing strategy up to December 31, 2020 divided by the number of cases when no test
is used) as a function of the total number of tests (a) and corresponding costs in US dollars (b) for different dates of start. Each dot corresponds to a different daily
testing rate and the dot size is proportional to the testing rate.
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observed in the data.The test-trace-quarantine strategy
Testing, tracing and quarantining positive individuals simulated consists in applying 10 thousand health agents from the
programme of primary health of the State Secretary of Health that would visit the 3,933,448 dwellings of the State of S~ao
Paulo. In each dwelling, the agent would interview the inhabitants questioning who had had any of the symptoms of COVID-
19 since March 2020 and about who had had contact to any individual who had the disease in the same period. In case of any
positive answer the individuals would be tested for the presence of the virus with the RT-PCR technique. In case of positive
result, the individual would be quarantined for 14 days.
The cost of the strategywas calculated assuming the cost of the test, assumed the price tag of US$48.00 per sample and the
cost of the agenst salary, assumed to be US$1128.00 per month. The total cost of each simulated strategy would depend on the
rate and of the total number of testing, as well as the duration of each strategy.51
Fig. 4. Results for the strategy that considers testing infected (symptomatic and asymptomatic) individuals showing the evolution of the testing strategy efficacy
(1 minus the number of cumulative cases under a specific testing strategy up to December 31, 2020 divided by the number of cases when no test is used) as a
function of the total number of tests (a) and corresponding costs in US dollars (b) for different dates of start. Each dot corresponds to a different daily testing rate
and the dot size is proportional to the testing rate.
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We fitted the model’s parameters simultaneously to the data of cumulative number of reported cases and deaths
(Fig. 2(a)e(b), respectively), and the number of ICU patients for the state of S~ao Paulo until July 18, 2020. To estimate a 95%
probability interval (shaded area in Fig. 2), we assumed a normal distribution for the contact rate with a standard deviation of
1.5%. The fitted parameters are shown in Table 1.
The results for the strategy that considers testing susceptible and infected (symptomatic and asymptomatic) individuals
are shown in Fig. 3. We calculated a testing strategy efficacy, subtracting from 1 the result of the division of the number of
cumulative cases under a specific testing strategy up to December 31, 2020 by the number of reported cases in a scenario in
which no test is used. The testing strategy efficacies as a function of the total number of tests and corresponding costs in US
dollars are shown in Fig. 3(a)e(b), respectively, for different times ti, the strategy started to be applied. We noticed that a 50%
reduction in the number of cases is only achieved when the total number of tests is approximately 40 million (the state
population is about 44.6 million people) with an approximate total cost of 2 billion US dollars, except for the start date of
August 1st.52
Fig. 5. Results for the strategy that considers testing infected (symptomatic and asymptomatic) individuals showing the evolution of the testing strategy efficacy
(1 minus the number of cumulative cases under a specific testing strategy up to December 31, 2020 divided by the number of cases when no test is used) as a
function of the daily testing rate for different dates of start. The dot size is proportional to the testing rate.
Fig. 6. Total number of tests over time and the corresponding number of cumulative cases for two different daily testing rates (0.5% and 2.1% per day) for mass
testing starting on April 1st.
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dividuals are shown in Fig. 4. The testing strategy efficacies as a function of the total number of tests and corresponding costs
in US dollars are shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b), respectively, for different dates of start.
In Figs. 3 and 4, each dot corresponds to a different daily testing rate and the dot size is proportional to the testing rate. Dot
sizes and corresponding testing rates can be observed in Fig. 5, in which we observe that higher testing rates and earlier start
dates are more efficacious.
In Fig. 4(a), dots in the upper part of the graph correspond to higher testing rates. For each date of start, we noticed that
dots corresponding to different testing rates are displayed in a concave shape. Thus, depending on the testing rate, similar
total number of tests may result in different efficacies. Let us consider the specific case of the testing rates 0.5% and 2.1% per
day for the start date of April 1st (Fig. 6). We noticed in Fig. 4(a) that the total number of tests used until December 31, 2020, is
similar (approximately 0.63 million tests) but the cumulative numbers of cases are about 0.95 and 0.27 million cases for the
rates 0.5% and 2.1% per day, respectively. In the model, the number of tested individuals is proportional to the number of
infected people. For a low testing rate, the initial number of individuals tested and consequently the number of individuals in
quarantine are both small, and the force of infection and thus the disease spread are not efficiently reduced. For a high testing
rate, on the other hand, the initial number of individuals tested and consequently the number of individuals in quarantine are
larger, hence the force of infection and the number of new cases are both reduced more efficiently over time.
When only (suspected) infected individuals are tested, the total cost is higher for earlier start dates (Fig. 4(b)), because
operational costs are substantionally higher than the costs related to the diagnostic tests.
Discussion
We modelled and simulated a test-trace-and-quarantine strategy to control the COVID-19 outbreak in the State of S~ao
Paulo, Brasil. The State of S~ao Paulo failed to adopt an effective social distancing strategy, reaching at most 59% in late March
and started to relax the measures in late June, dropping to 42% in 11 September (Sistema de Monitoramento Inteligente do
Estado de S~ao Paulo, 2020). Therefore, S~ao Paulo relies heavily on a massive testing strategy in the attempt to control the
epidemic.
We simulated two alternative strategies combined with economic evaluations. One strategy included indiscriminately
testing the entire population of the State, reaching more than 40 million people at a maximum cost of 2.25 billion USD, that
would reduce the total number of cases by the end of 2020 by 90%. The second strategy investigated testing only symptomatic
cases and their immediate contacts e this strategy reached a maximum cost of 150 million USD but also reduced the number
of cases by 90%. As we were interested in the simulation of the impact of testing and quarantining in the spread of the
infection in the general population, we did not included testing for other clustering. For instance, health workers are tested
regularly in Sao Paulo and are isolated when tested positive.
Our model has the following limitations. The model assumes a perfect test with 100% sensitiviy and specificity; we also
assumed that tracing the contacts of the positive cases would be perfect, which is obviously a practical impossibility. Another
important limitation of the model is that it does not consider any delay in the results of the test, an important factor that has
been limiting this strategy in many places of the world (Kretzschmar et al., 2020). Although the current tests have a delay of
many days to present the results, many rapid-molecular point of care tests for detecting positive patients to SARS-CoV-2 are in
development (Ahmad et al., 2020), so the delay in test results can be overcome. However, our model does not take into
account social inequity in accessing testing (Souza et al., 2020; Martins-Filho et al., 2020). Some strategies could be
considered to reduce the testing costs like pooling samples for testing (Abid et al., 2020) or concentrating the tests in
neighborhood where sewege systems were tested positive (Foladori et al., 2020).
Conclusion
Had the State of S~ao Paulo decided to adopt this strategy on April the 1st, it would have been possible to reduce the total
number of cases in 90% at a cost of 2.25 billion US dollars for the indiscriminate strategy but at a much smaller cost of 125
million US dollars for the selective testing of symptomatic cases and their contacts.We conclude that a selective test, trace and
quarantine strategy is the most cost effective strategy that could be applied in situations where social distancing is difficult to
implement.
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